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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the packer of the common law duty to the public that the meat is fit and
wholesome and the liability is not shifted to the government. 18
M. T. L.
Master and Servant: Family purpose doctrine in connection with
family automobile.-In the recent case of Payne v. Leininger (Minn.
1924) N. W. 435 the defendant owned a family automobile. His son
was of age but a member of the household and, with the father's per-
mission, took the car for a trip to South Dakota with a young woman
with whom he was keeping company and her mother. The automobile
overturned and the young woman was killed and her mother severely
injured. There was testimony that the purpose of the son and young
woman in going to South Dakota was to be married there. Plaintiff
requested the trial court to charge that if such were the facts the auto-
mobile was in use for a "family purpose." The trial court left the
question to the jury and there was a verdict for defendant. On appeal,
the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in refusing
plaintiff's instruction.
In this class of cases there are two possible theories on which to hold
the owner liable. First, that of master and servant, and second, negli-
gence of the owner in intrusting his automobile to an incompetent
person.
In order to hold the owner liable upon the latter theory, aside from
the master and servant relation, it is essential that he might reasonably
have anticipated the injury as a consequence of permitting the in-
competent person to employ the instrument which produced the injury
and further that the owner's negligence made the injury possible.1
Thus, if a father places his car in charge of a child of tender years he
is liable for the resulting injuries. This rule is not based upon the
theory of imputed negligence but upon his own negligence in intrusting
his automobile to the child.2
the anticipated refreshing drink. He was in the frame of mind to approve the
poet's words:
"The best laid schemes o' mice an' men
Gang oft aglay
An' lea'e us nought but grief an' pain,
For promis'd joy !"
Held, when a manufacturer makes, bottles and sells to the retail trade, to be
again sold to the general public, a beverage represented to be refreshing and
harmless, he is under a legal duty to see to it that in the process of bottling no
foreign substance shall be mixed with the beverage which, if taken into the
human stomach, will be injurious." In this case it was further held that the
bottler owes this duty to the general public for whom his drinks are intended
as well as to the retailer to whom he sells.
"Catani v. Swift Co., 521 Pa. 52; 95 Atl. 391. (1915). The defendant sold
pork which contained trichina of which the plaintiff ate and became sick. Held,
that although the government inspector had passed on this meat the packer still
owed the duty to the public to sell only wholesome and fit meat.
'Allen v. Bland, Tex. Civ. App. (1914) 168 S. W. 35.
'Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, io8 N. E. 406.
NOTES AND COMMENT
Turning now to the former: namely, that of master and servant
relationship, it is well settled at common law that the parent is not
liable for the torts of even his minor child.3 Neither is the mere
relationship of parent and child sufficient in itself to create the relation
of master and servant.4 It has been repeatedly held that an automobile
is not in itself an inherently dangerous instrumentality so that its mere
use will render the owner liable fb'r accidents caused by one handling
it, although at the time the driver is not acting for the owner.5 The
"family purpose" doctrine as to the use of an automobile and the
liability of the owner is not adopted in Wisconsin and is specifically
rejected in the leading case of Crossett v. Goelcer, supra. From these
propositions it is evident that, in Wisconsin, to render the father liable
for damages inflicted by the negligent operation of his automobile by
his competent minor son such liability must be predicated upon the
same fundamental principles of master and servant which would govern
in the case of the use of any other instrumentality owned by the father
and used or operated by the son and no presumption of liability results
solely from the domestic relationship.6 While the "family purpose"
doctrine is not accepted in Wisconsin, yet it has been held that where
it is proved that the father is the owner of the instrumentality causing
the injury and that his competent minor son was negligent, there is
a prinma facie case and the presumption is that the son was acting in
the father's behalf and upon the father's direction.7 However, this is a
Meers v. McDowell, 110 Ky. 926, 62 S. W. 1013.
'Chastain v. Johns, 12o Ga. 977, 48 S. E. 343.
'Blair v. Broadwater, 121 Va. 301, 93 S. E. 632.
Smith v. Jordan, 211 Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761.
Crossett v. Goelser, 177 Wis. 455, 188 N. W. 627.
Danforth v. Fisher, 75 N. H. III, 71 Atl. 535.
But see: Hays v. Hoga,, 273 Mo. I, 165 S. W. 1125, L. R. A. x918 C. 715.
* In the case of Kumba z'. Gilham, 103 Wis. 312, 79 N. W. 325 the court said,
"The law is well settled that no general liability of the father for torts of a
minor son exists. Such a liability in general results only from the rule of
respondent superior when the fact of agency for the father is proved. In the
Wisconsin case of Hiroux v. Baum, 137 Wis. 197, 118 N. W. 533, where the
father purchased an automobile on solicitation of his minor son and is was
understood between the father and son that the son should learn to operate
the car while the son was operating it under the direction of the man from
whom the car was purchased the injury occurred and it was held that it was
a question for the jury whether or not the son was acting for the father.
Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis. 4oo, 198 N. W. 738.
"Where the plaintiff has suffered injury from the negligent management of a
vehicle, such as a boat, car or carriage, it is sufficient prima facie evidence that
the negligence was imputable to the defendant, to show that he was the owner
of the thing, without proving affirmatively that the person in charge was the
defendant's servant. It lies with the defendant to show that the person in
charge was not his servant, leaving him to show, if he can, that the property
was not under his control at the time." Shearmnan. & Redfield, Law of Neg-
ligence (6th Ed.) Sect. x58. The case of Schaefer v. Osterbrink, 67 Wis. 495,
3o N. W. 922, holds that this is a mere presiumption and the courts in Wis-
consin apparently refuse to extend this doctrine.
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mere presumption and may be rebutted by the father showing that no
such relation existed in fact. As to competent adult children who are
living as members of the family the liability of the parent can be based
only upon the relation of master and servant. Also, the owner is liable
for the negligence of his chauffeur only while he is acting within the
apparent scope of his authority.9
It is evident from the principal case and the authorities cited, that
Minnesota has fully accepted the "family purpose" doctrine. However,
this state does not stand alone upon this proposition. ° One of the
leading cases in support of this doctrine is the Tennessee case of King v.
Smythe, supra. Says the court, "If an instrumentality of this kind
(automobile) is placed in the hands of his family by a father, for the
family's pleasure, comfort and entertainment, the dictates of natural
justice should require that the owner should be responsible for its negli-
gent operation. . . . A judgment for damages against an infant
daughter or infant son, or a son without support or property, who is
living as a member of the family, would be an empty form."
The courts which adopt the "family purpose" doctrine place it upon
the theory that the father had made it part of his business to furnish
entertainment for the members of his family and that therefore, when
he permitted one of them to use the car, even for the latter's personal
and sole pleasure, the father is liable as principal because the child was
really carrying out the business of the father." Those jurisdictions
which reject the doctrine hold "that it is" a fantastic notion that a son,
in using the family automobile to take a ride by himself for pure
pleasure, is the agent of his father in furnishing amusement for him-
self, is really carrying on his father's business and that his father, as
principal, should be liable for the result of the son's negligent manner
of furnishing the entertainment to himself.' 12
'Drakenberg v. Knight, 178 Wis. 386. Smith v. Burns, i4Z Pac. 352 (Ore.)
Mooney v. Canier, 197 N. W. 625 (Iowa) x924.
"In the case of Parker v. Barber, 177 Wis. 588, where a chauffeur was charged
with the duty of keeping his employer's automobile in repair, had discovered
and fixed a leaky pump, and in order to test the pump to see whether or not
it still leaked, and also to make a call on a friend, started on a trip, a distance
of fifteen miles, and an accident occurred during such trip, it was held to be
a jury question as to whether the chauffeur was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident. Youngquist v. L. J. Droese Co., 167 Wis.
458. See also Jones v. Hage, 47 Wash. 663, 92 Pac. 433.
"McNeal v. McKaia, 33 Okla. 449, 126 Pac. 742, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 775.
Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S. W. 52, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 224-
Gurgnon v. Campbell, 141 Pac. 1O31 (Wash.).
King v. Smythe, 24o Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296, L. R. A. 1918 F. 293.
Jones v. Cook, (1922) II1 S. E. 828 (W. Va.).
Benton v. Regeser, 179 Pac. 966 (Ariz.).
Griffin v. Russell, (1915) 144 Ga. 275, 87 S. E. io, L. R. A. 1916 F. 216.
Collison v. Cutter, (I919) 17o N. W. 421 (Iowa).
Lewis v. Steele, 52 Mont. 300, 157 Pac. 575.
Lashbrook v. Patten, (1864) 1 Dur. (Ky.) 36.
"Arkin v. Pagte, 287 Ill. 420, 223 N. E. 30, 5 A. L. R. 216 (I919).
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NOTES AND COMMENT
While this doctrine may be legally sound yet those jurisdictions which
reject it 1i do so, apparently, refusing to apply any advanced or hypo-
thetical reasoning to the fundamental principles of agency, or to extend
those rules applicable to master and servant. The courts of New York,
Wisconsin and other jurisdictions hold that it is within the province
of the legislature to distinguish the liability of the automobile owner
from that of the owner of any other instrumentality not inherently
dangerous, 14 and, such being the case, it is not within the purview of
the courts to fix the liability of the owner, by distorting the fundamental
principles of master and servant.
E. E. J.
Navigable Waters: United States may enjoin withdrawal of
water from Lake Michigan in excess of that authorized by Secre-
tary of War.-Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 45
Supreme Court Reporter 177 -It has long been a boast of Chicago that
it has reversed the current of the Chicago River and has made it flow
out of the lake instead of into it. As a mere engineering feat, this
cannot, however, be considered as a notable achievement. Not only is
the watershed between Lake Michigan and the tributaries of the Missis-
sippi River very close to the lake but it is also very low and, hence,
presents no outstanding physical difficulties. It was, therefore, a com-
paratively simple matter to reverse the river.
The object of Chicago, or technically speaking the Sanitary District,
in reversing the river, of course, was an extremely practical one.
Chicago naturally produces an enormous amount of sewage which must
be disposed of. Since throwing this refuse into the lake would tend
to poison the water supply of the city, and since erecting modern sewage
disposal plants is quite expensive, what could be simpler than to make
the lake run through the city via the Chicago River and connect the
Chicago River through the Des Plaines River with the Illinois River
and thus empty the sewage of the city into the Mississippi River some
distance above St. Louis? That the smaller cities of Illinois situated
along the Illinois River would be unpleasantly affected was true, but
such a small consideration could not be taken into account when thrown
into the balance against the much greater convenience which Chicago
thereby achieved for itself. That the sanitary condition of large cities
on the Mississippi River, such as St. Louis, would not be improved by
emptying such an enormous open sewer into the Father of Waters was
hardly even to be. regretted from a Chicago viewpoint and certainly was
no reason whatsoever for changing the situation. Besides, the canal
'Watkins v. Clark, (igi8) 1O3 Kan. 629, 176 Pac. 131, L. R. A. i917 F. 363.
Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 22o N. Y. 1II, 115 N. E. 443.
Pratt v. Ceautier, no AtI. 353 (Me.) i92o.
Bright v. Thacher, (1919) 202 Mo. App. 301, 215 S. W. 788.
Elms v. Flick, (i919) 126 N. E. 66 (Ohio).
"Cunninghant v. Castle, 127 N. Y. App. Div. 58o.
Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, supra.
Crossett v. Goelzer, 177 Wis. 455, I88 N. W. 627.
